MedusaLocker Ransomware Recovery: What's Recoverable
MedusaLocker is a ransomware-as-a-service family first seen in 2019. Despite the similar name it is a different operation from Medusa ransomware. It is still active: in September 2026 it posted 13 victims on its leak site, two of them in India, alongside victims in Spain, the United States, Bangladesh and Canada (ransomware.live data).
How it gets in
MedusaLocker affiliates mostly enter through Remote Desktop (RDP) exposed to the internet with weak or stolen passwords, through VPN accounts without multi-factor authentication, and through phishing. Tools reported in its intrusions include Mimikatz and Invoke-TheHash for credentials, Advanced IP Scanner and SoftPerfect NetScan to map the network, PsExec to spread, and tools such as PCHunter and Process Hacker to stop security software.
What it does to the files
Files are encrypted with AES, with the key protected by RSA, and get an extension that changes between versions and affiliates. The extension alone is therefore not a reliable way to identify the family: the ransom note and the encrypted files themselves are. Check the No More Ransom project for a decryptor for your exact version before anything else, and never run one on your only copy.
Recovery without the key comes from what was not encrypted: older backups and shadow copies that survived, and the unencrypted parts of large files such as databases and virtual disks. That is measured on the files before anything else is decided.
What to do first
Isolate the affected systems, but do not wipe, reinstall or "clean" anything yet, and do not run decryptors found online on your only copy. Keep the ransom note, a few encrypted files and, if you have them, unencrypted copies of the same files from before the attack: comparing the two shows exactly how the files were encrypted.
Then establish what is recoverable before deciding anything else: how much of each database, virtual disk and backup file was encrypted, and what the untouched parts still hold. Large files are often only partly encrypted, and that is where recovery without the key comes from.
Veeam backups, SQL Server or Oracle databases encrypted by MedusaLocker?
Ransomware groups go after the backup repository first. A .vbk or .vib file renamed by the ransomware is often not lost: large backup files are usually only partly encrypted, and the intact blocks can be verified and rebuilt into the virtual disks. The same holds for SQL Server MDF and BAK files and for Oracle datafiles and Data Pump exports: the rows the ransomware did not reach can be read directly. In real cases we rebuilt a 466 GB server disk from a 43 GB Akira-encrypted VBK, and recovered 98.8% of the rows from LockBit-encrypted SQL Server backups.
- Ransomware-encrypted Veeam VBK recovery →
- AS VBK Recovery Studio: free analysis of an encrypted VBK →
- Ransomware-encrypted SQL Server database recovery →
- AS SQL Recovery & Repair Studio: free analysis of an encrypted MDF or BAK →
- Ransomware-encrypted Oracle database recovery →
- NAS and RAID ransomware recovery →
- Ransomware-encrypted VMware VMDK recovery →
Ransomware recovery and incident response →
Facing this problem? Contact us now.
We have already solved 656+ ransomware and data recovery cases: encrypted and corrupted SQL Server, Oracle and MySQL databases, Tally, Busy and Marg ERP data, Veeam backups, VMware and Hyper-V virtual machines, RAID and NAS. Send us the details and we tell you what we can recover.
- ✓ Free assessment before you pay anything
- ✓ No data, no charge
- ✓ NDA on request
Email: info [at] asittech.com · Mon–Fri, 9:00–18:00 IST